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Abstract 
During the past few decades, frame analysis has become a popular concept in political com-
munication studies as a tool for understanding underlying beliefs and motives in public con-
flicts. The study of conflicts focusing on labor market reforms has even longer been of pivotal 
concern for several other social science sub-disciplines such as research on the welfare state. 
We try to combine these research traditions with a newspaper content analysis conducted in 
the U.K., France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Austria. The framing of em-
ployment relations varies across countries as could be expected on the basis of their historical 
legacies of politico-economic coordination, but only if we take the presence and degree of 
pressure for liberalizing reforms into account. Furthermore, the results show that, on both the 
political left and right, mainstream actors must be distinguished from challengers to explain 
actor-specific differences. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Policymaking is a process of social learning, in which conﬂicts on ideas and values play 
a crucial role. In today’s established democracies, these ideational and value-based conﬂicts 
are increasingly carried out in mass-mediated public debates, making these debates a central 
forum for social learning (Sniderman, 2000, p. 75). In this paper, we explore the role of ideas 
in the public debate on employment relations by means of a frame analysis of newspaper arti-
cles in six Western European countries (the U.K., France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzer-
land, and Austria). Frames have become a crucial tool for understanding the underlying 
mechanisms that shape ideas in public debates and thus politics in general (Scheff, 2005). 
Accordingly, we have strong evidence of the importance of frames in opinion formation pro-
cesses in policy domains as diverse as immigration, abortion, welfare, or Europeanization 
(Ferree et al., 2002; Medrano, 2003; Helbling et al. 2010, Chong and Druckmann 2007). 
Since little is known about the framing of employment relations, we will consider in the 
following the questions of how and why actors and countries differ in their framing of con-
flicts over labor market issues. Ultimately, this reveals how ideologies are integrated into eve-
ryday political conﬂicts on labor market policies and the surrounding institutional agreements 
(Kriesi et al. 2012). This analysis explores the impact of path dependency, reform pressure 
and actor preferences on the use of specific frames to justify positions on labor market issues. 
On the one hand, we start from an institutionalist’s perspective and ask whether and how na-
tional peculiarities shape the competition for the dominant framing of employment relations. 
In establishing the links between institutions and the arguments used, the analysis thus reveals 
how in different countries the debate climate systematically differs according to the historical 
development of the labor market regimes. In addition, we will show that this path dependency 
interacts with the pressure for reform in the employment regime, i.e., whether the countries’ 
governments recently managed to implement labor market reforms targeted to enhance com-
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petitiveness. On the other hand, this analysis scrutinizes which actors mobilize which particu-
lar frame and how frames relate to the actors’ the policy positions. Instead of simply pitting 
policy positions of actors against each other, we may better understand why and how em-
ployment relation reforms are criticized by analyzing the political actors’ reasoning about 
them. 
These questions will be addressed by focusing on the public arena as it is reflected by 
the sum of public communications related to employment relations (see Helbling et al., 2011). 
We use the terms labor market issues and employment relations synonymously and deﬁne 
them in a fairly broad way as “all the behaviours, outcomes, practices, and institutions that 
emanate from or impinge on the [employment] relationship” (Kaufman, 2004, p. 45). More 
precisely, we assume that employment relations comprise the specific labor market policies 
such as wage agreements as well as the institutional settings where these policies are negotiat-
ed, decided, and implemented such as collective bargaining sites. Accordingly, the public 
debate on employment relations involves the communication process of a multitude of actors 
with vested interests. 
Our country sample pits the three biggest European economies, France, Germany and 
the U.K., against the three small Western European countries of Switzerland, the Netherlands, 
and Austria. The three big economies have a pivotal role in the European economy which 
becomes manifest in the fact that, taken together, they are responsible for half of the European 
Union’s gross domestic product (IMF, 2010). Beyond their pure economic strength, these 
countries differ considerably with respect to their historical pathways of economic develop-
ment. The three small economies, on the other hand, represent the group of coordinated, adap-
tive, and successful Western European economies with a small workforce and high export 
market dependency. 
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FRAMING EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 
Frames are “central organizing ideas that provide coherence to a designated set of idea 
elements” (Ferree et al., 2002, p. 105). In a more instrumental perspective, frames serve as 
cognitive cues indicating agreement on basic principles and linking speciﬁc policy positions 
to collective beliefs and values (Surel, 2000; Helbling et al. 2011). Thus, by using a frame, a 
political actor clariﬁes how he deﬁnes a problem and discloses what its causal interpretation 
should be (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Ultimately, actors strive to promote the frames that will be 
of greatest use in mobilizing support for their positions. This competition for the prevailing 
frame among political actors is conceptualized in manifold ways in the literature: as framing, 
priming, second-order agenda setting, or second-level agenda setting (Weaver 2007; Kiousis 
et al., 2006; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987, p. 63). Yet, all of these concepts share the central no-
tion that the perceived importance of speciﬁc interpretations is crucial to the outcome of opin-
ion formation processes (Chong and Druckman, 2007, p. 115). Thus, we will examine the 
frames actors employ to manipulate the importance of specific aspects of labor market issues.
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Moreover, the actors’ framing has to be consistent with their core ideologies, since they need 
to establish sustainable credibility in the public debate. 
As Entman (2004, p. 14) speciﬁes, the most successful frames are those “fully congru-
ent with schemas habitually used by most members of society”. With respect to employment 
relations in Western Europe, this resonance with central societal themes is most likely 
achieved by the use of the ideological paradigms that have shaped the political economy since 
the beginnings of the modern European state (Gartzke, 2007; Surel, 2000, p. 169f.). Table 1 
presents the paradigms as derived from the three historically dominant schools of thought: 
liberalism, neomercantilism and social democracy. While social democratic and liberal frames 
have been identified by previous accounts of framing processes related to economic issues 
                                                 
1
 Since the focus lies solely on framing by the political elite, framing effects (i.e., how framing inﬂuences indi-
viduals’ attitudes; see Brewer & Gross 2005) and journalistic framing (i.e., how messages are selected and rein-
terpreted by the media; see Matthes 2007) are not considered in this contribution. 
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(see Chong and Druckmann, 2007), this analysis adds neomercantilist arguments to the devic-
es available for justifying positions on labor market policies. As will be discussed below, his-
torically, neomercantilist ideas were developed independently from social democratic and 
liberal ideas and cater to the interests of public administrations and domestically oriented 
businesses. 
[table 1 about here] 
Systematic accounts of political economic thought started to emerge in seventeenth and 
eighteenth century Britain (Skousen, 2001), since “the growth of a market society in the early 
nineteenth century was driven by the ideology of liberalism that found expression in [...] mar-
ket discourse as the ‘common sense’ of the emerging capitalist system” (Tarrow and Capo-
raso, 2009, p. 595f.). The regulatory program of economic liberalism allowed the European 
economies to be released from the formerly prevailing mercantilist structures. Later on, in the 
aftermath of the disastrous Great Depression, the liberal pro market core beliefs succumbed to 
the Social Democratic compromise. 
Sketched in broad strokes, the liberal paradigm stands out by two central ideas which 
are listed as “economic freedom” and “prosperity” in table 1. On the one hand, its inherent 
notion of economic liberty justiﬁes the emphasis on both property rights and individual free-
dom as a basic human need (Kitschelt, 1994). On the other hand, classical economic liberal-
ism stands out for its emphasis on prosperity: if individuals strive for success, the whole soci-
ety proﬁts through the efficient allocation of resources by market mechanisms. 
Liberalism was progressive with respect to its questioning of the mercantilist paradigm 
of pre-industrial Europe (Magnusson, 2003). Mercantilist doctrines were rooted in the idea 
that trade among nations is a zero-sum game and that states had to protect their own economy 
at the expense of others. In the nineteenth century, mercantilist theories were modiﬁed to be-
come more comprehensive approaches that also considered the role of the state in the econo-
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my. Reinvented as neomercantilism, it became the theory of state dirigisme by which territo-
rial entities achieve economic wealth and political power (Immerwahr, 2009). Today, the con-
tinued vitality of these ideas is apparent in demands for the establishment of state-industrial 
complexes in strategic markets. These ideas are subsumed under the label “intervention” in 
table 1. Furthermore, neomercantilist thinking is also inﬂuential for nationalistic or regionalist 
approaches in international politics, evident in cases such as the justiﬁcation of a common 
trade policy for the European Union (Hurrell, 1995; van Apeldoorn, 2002). This emphasis of 
a regional or national interest is described by the second neomercantilist category (“protec-
tion”) in table 1. 
While classical liberalism tried to overcome mercantilist ideas, it itself was challenged 
by several inﬂuential leftist movements, ranging from revolutionary anarchists to moderate 
socialists (King 2003). In Western Europe, this thinking became an integral part of the politi-
cal system, especially in the postwar compromise between labor and capital (Tarrow and 
Caporaso, 2009, p. 598). Accordingly, the main focus of social democratic ideas in Western 
Europe lies on the correction of the main ﬂaws of capitalism: social protection from the most 
acute hardships, and the respect of basic human rights beyond economic imperatives (“fair-
ness” and “social justice” in table 1). 
In the light of these developments of economic thinking, we expect the frames that 
promote the social democratic and protectionist dimension as a response to longstanding de-
mands for compensation, either in a welfare or identitarian sense. Historically, far-reaching 
economic liberalization only was sustainable if coupled with growing welfare states and se-
lective protection that cushioned the victims of increased competitiveness and freer markets 
(Cameron 1978, Katzenstein 1985, Rodrik 1998). Furthermore, we expect the dimension sub-
suming liberal and interventionist frames to appear in the debate since it reflects the economic 
orthodoxy that dominates discourse in contemporary Western Europe. This framing dimen-
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sion will be labeled as the growth dimension in the following. 
HOW TO EXPLAIN THE USE OF FRAMES 
To explain the use of the compensation and growth dimensions of framing, we propose 
theoretical arguments at two different levels. As shown in figure 1, we will outline that the 
framing of employment relations, in a first step depends on the specific national contexts. To 
this aim, we consider hypotheses derived from a model of national divergence of the debates 
on employment relations, which explains national framing differences that correspond with 
distinct historical pathways of coordination and regulation at the country level. Along with the 
Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) and welfare state regime literature, we therefore suppose that 
framing depends on the national ideological imprint (Esping-Andersen 1998; Huber et al. 
1993; Huber and Stephens 2001). These hypotheses are complemented by expectations that 
the immediate temporal context of debates is influential as well. More precisely, we assume 
that the debate shifts to the growth dimension if a country suffers from too many delayed la-
bor market reforms. 
[figure 1 about here] 
In a second step, we also take an actor-specific perspective and argue that differences in 
frame use can be explained by actor characteristics. Since the public is exposed to and choos-
es among competing frames, actors seek to inﬂuence which key organizing ideas are used for 
the evaluation of speciﬁc issues (Chong and Druckman, 2007; Kriesi et al., 2009). To explain 
the actors’ framing, we start from the assumption that they employ frames in accordance with 
the underlying structural potentials of the debate, i.e., actors choose frames suitable for repre-
senting the specific interests they need to promote. An obvious example is political parties, 
which must seek to mobilize their constituencies. To this aim, we will distinguish between 
left-right ideological positions and the divide between the winners and losers of post-
industrialization and globalization, i.e. actors belonging to the mainstream political forces and 
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those representing the losers. Following Rueda’s (2006) argument, we can expect those politi-
cal actors that are in a mainstream position to concentrate foremost on the winners, whereas 
the losers’ interests are more difficult to mobilize due to their heterogeneity (Bonoli 2005). 
The losers’ interests are therefore only addressed by less institutionalized political stakehold-
ers. 
We will test these expected differences against the often observed evidence of a policy 
change dominated by economically liberal ideas in Western European politics on employment 
relations and, consequentially, a general convergence of labor market regimes (Clayton and 
Pontusson, 1998; Streeck, 2006; Baccaro and Simoni, 2008). This means that we assume lib-
eral frames to prevail in the debates but nevertheless expect framing patterns to systematically 
vary as a function of country or actor characteristics. 
COORDINATION PATTERNS AND REFORM PRESSURE 
Many influential theoretical frameworks in comparative political economy put the di-
vergent path thesis forward, which states that differences in economic policy making among 
countries are persistent (Kitschelt, 1999, p. 444; Hays 2009, Hall and Soskice, 2001). Much of 
the early research on globalization contests such claims, arguing that market internationaliza-
tion is forcing advanced economies to converge onto a single neoliberal model (e.g., Moses, 
1994). A similar argument with respect to labor market policies was made by Jessop (1993) 
who argues that labor markets in Europe are continuously being reshaped towards a workfare 
model. According to him, inspired primarily by the U.S.A., countries are expected to con-
verge as a consequence of the diffusion of the neoliberal policies which consider unemploy-
ment as primary a behavioral problem and which should therefore be corrected by negative 
incentives (sanctions) (compare Daguerre 2007; Jessop 1993). Also, more recent accounts of 
institutional change emphasize that there is a tendency to overstate the extent to which exist-
ing institutional differences reproduce themselves (e.g. Streeck and Thelen, 2005). The litera-
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ture thus far from agrees on how resilient institutional configurations are, i.e. how strongly 
path dependency keeps economies on diverging paths. We argue that–at least with regard to 
the public debate and the rhetorical use of compensation and growth related arguments–there 
still are significant differences among the seemingly similar Western European countries. 
 Among the many conceptualizations of political-economic arrangements, an important 
attempt is the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach, distinguishing, first, the Liberal mar-
ket economies (LME) and second, the Coordinated market economies (CME) (Hall and 
Soskice 2001; Hancké, Rhodes, and Thatcher, 2007). Whereas in LME such as the U.K., the 
economic players are coordinated by means of competitive and hierarchical market arrange-
ments, in CME the coordination of economic activities, for instance, industrial relations, secu-
rity of employment, investor relations, or inter-firm negotiations is based on more horizontal 
and less market oriented mechanisms, as illustrated through the case of tripartite concertation. 
Table 2 shows the differences in coordination patterns between the countries included in our 
study, which are described by means of the level of Employment Protection Legislation 
(EPL)
2
 and the Hall-Gingrich coordination index
3
. The EPL measures the extent to which a 
firms’ ability to fire their workers is constrained by collective agreements or national legisla-
tion. This results in a divide in our sample of countries with those with more flexible labor 
markets (U.K. and Switzerland) on the one side and more regulated ones (especially France 
and Germany) on the other. Second, the degree of coordination in labor relations and corpo-
rate governance is captured by the Hall-Gingrich index, which allows for distinguishing be-
tween countries where labor relations and corporate governance are highly coordinated as is 
the case in Austria and Germany, and those where this is very liberal like the United Kingdom, 
                                                 
2
 For details about the construction of the indicator see OECD (2012), 
http://www.oecd.org/document/11/0,3746,en_2649_37457_42695243_1_1_1_37457,00.html 
3
 The Hall-Gingrich (2004) Cooperation Index results from a factor analysis of six indicators, i.e. “shareholder 
power”, “dispersion of control”, “size of stock market”, “level of wage coordination”, “degree of wage coordina-
tion” and “labour turnover” for the years between 1990-1995 and which is standardized to vary between 0 (low 
coordination) and 1 (high coordination). 
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and Switzerland and the Netherlands to a lesser extent.  
[table 2 about here] 
 The strength of the VoC approach lies in the acknowledgment of the importance of 
business actors. However, as it becomes evident considering the case of France (see table 2), 
where the degree of coordination is comparable to that of Switzerland and the Netherlands, 
the traditional VoC approach fails to adequately acknowledge the role of the state in regulat-
ing and stabilizing the coordination mechanisms in labor market regimes. This central player 
is accordingly re-introduced by Schmidt (2009), whose theoretical framework shows that the 
nature of state interventions is able to capture and explain part of the divergence among CME 
countries. Schmidt adds the State-Influenced Market Economies (SME) to the VoC typology 
by separating, and hence the low coordination scores on the Hall-Gingrich index for France 
have to be considered with caution. In fact, in SMEs the governments and administrations 
play a dominant role and influence employment relations and the coordination efforts between 
the economy and social partners. The most clear-cut case of an SME country is France, which 
is characterized by a strong state in Badie and Birnbaum’s (1983) understanding. In fact, it 
can be expected that the decision-making and implementation processes in France are charac-
terized by a higher degree of centralization, and hence the state has the power to enforce poli-
cies unilaterally if necessary (Baccaro and Sang-Hoon 2007; Ferrera and Gualmini 2004; Mo-
lina and Rhodes 2007). Accordingly, in France, modernization strategies have traditionally 
relied on major industrial projects involving far-reaching state interventions (Thibergien 
2007). On the contrary, in CMEs such as Germany or the Netherlands, these coordination 
activities are based on systems of agreements that are built around non-hierarchical negotia-
tions. Due to the exceptional strength of the state in SMEs and the consequential focus on the 
strength of the national economy, we expect compensation related arguments to be especially 
prevalent in France because domestically oriented or strategically important industries have a 
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lot of leverage in the political process. 
 From the four remaining CMEs, the Netherlands and Switzerland can be further differ-
entiated (Visser and Afonso: 2010). Similar to other continental European economies, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland face high wage floors and fixed labor costs, but as outliers they 
rely on a relatively flexible labor market to compensate for economic difficulties by extending 
part-time and temporary employment (Visser and Hemerjick 1997; Bonoli and Mach 2000). 
Moreover, in contrast to other CMEs, labor movements traditionally play a subordinate role 
and business interests are dominated by the large export-oriented companies. It is therefore 
expected that Switzerland and the Netherlands represent a liberal leaning variation of the gen-
eral continental CME (Schnyder and Heemskerk, 2008). 
 Viewed in its entirety, we might see the following ranking for the emphasis of growth 
related arguments from the strongest to the weakest: U.K., Switzerland, the Netherlands, 
Germany, Austria, and France. However, not only can we expect the institutional variables 
such as the degree of coordination or the strictness of employment protection legislation to 
influence the way in which labor market relations are framed in the public debate, but we can 
also suppose that country-specific reform pressure represents a pivotal additional variable 
which can alter the framing strategies. In countries where the Employment Protection Legisla-
tion (EPL) is rather inflexible and governments have not yet addressed the pressure for more 
competitiveness (Austria and France), the national debate can be expected to shift to a pro-
market framing (growth). As illustrated by table 2, this mainly applies to Austria and France 
with EPL levels of 2.04 and 2.8 as well as only 5 and 7 liberalizing reforms. 
ACTOR PREFERENCES 
Besides the influence of the national context on the overall framing of labor market de-
bates, we also expect the framing strategies to diverge between different stakeholders. How-
ever, before their framing strategies are explored, it has to be clariﬁed which actor types in-
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habit the debate on employment relations, since a simpliﬁcation of the multitude of statements 
by conﬂating them to actor types heavily preconditions the interpretation of empirical ﬁndings. 
Table A.2 lists the actor types and how they will be used in the analyses. 
The classiﬁcation initially makes the very broad distinction between public authority ac-
tors, interest groups, parties, and corporations. The public authority actors include interna-
tional governmental organizations like the World Trade Organization, European Union actors, 
as well as administrative bodies. Interest groups are divided into trade unions and employer 
associations. The latter category also comprises professional organizations, which had too few 
statements to be collapsed into an own category. With respect to the trade unions, private sec-
tor unions (including peak unions) are distinguished from public sector unions. In a similar 
vein, peak employer associations and white-collar organizations are separated from small 
business associations and farmers’ organizations. Corporations, ﬁnally, are differentiated into 
public enterprises and multinational corporations. 
 Depending on the political constituency whose interests they traditionally represent, 
these actors can be expected to advance and use different frames. More specifically, we argue 
that the structure of political debates on employment relations entails two political divides 
shaping the patterns of justifications. Firstly, the traditional left-right divide can be expected 
to have retained important explanatory power. Even though many scholars argue that it has 
developed merely into a valence issue (Dalton et al. 1984, Kitschelt 1994, Hardin 2000), it is 
evident that the ideological antagonism between labor and capital still divides today’s politics 
at least to some extent (Pontusson and Rueda 2010). Apart from the opposition between state 
and market, this divide concerns also the characteristics of de-commodification4 policies. It 
separates labor, i.e. unions, parties on the left and public interest groups (social movements 
                                                 
4
 Esping-Anderson (1998) defines de-commodification as social policies, which were adopted by the welfare 
states to ensure workers’ pay against traditional risks, i.e. sickness, injury and unemployment. Hence, de-
commodifying policies were introduced to decrease the dependence of employees and their families from the 
(labor) market (Schwartz 2001).  
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and charity organizations) which favor highly redistributive policies, from capital, i.e. parties 
on the right, employer’s organizations and international firms, which prefer means tested ben-
efit structures (Esping-Andersen 1998 and 1996). 
 However, the ideological left-right conflict is not as encompassing as it once was. It is 
at least partly overlaid with the divide emerging from the more recent socio-economic trans-
formations such as globalization
5
 and post-industrialization
6
 (Bonoli 2005 and 2006, Häuser-
mann 2010, Kriesi et al. 2008; Esping-Anderson 2009). Hence, we can expect that economic 
preferences have become more complex within the left as well as the right block (Häuser-
mann 2009; Fossati 2012). Following Kriesi et al. (2006 and 2008: 4-5), economic winners 
are best conceptualized as having sufficient exit options in terms of their employment situa-
tion. The pivotal determinant is the level of marketable skills, since a high educational attain-
ment guarantees an individuals’ successful economic mobility even in highly flexible and 
internationalized labor markets (Oesch 2006). These marketable skills, which are captured in 
the case of Schwander and Häusermann (2009) by occupational profiles, make it possible to 
capture stable political preferences. Occupational profiles can be seen as a composite concept 
of the individuals’ employment status derived from the skill-level, the protection guaranteed 
by work contracts, and the work logic of jobs (see Oesch 2006).
7
 
 In brief, we share the perception that the interests of the economic winners (or insiders, 
see Rueda 2006) of the last few decades are increasingly opposed by the needs of the losers 
(or outsiders). The decisive political dilemma for the politics of employment relations there-
fore is a situation where the winners are calling for more deregulation in order to sustain their 
benefits, whereas the losers are increasingly demanding social and national protective policy 
                                                 
5
 Understood as the increase in cultural diversity, political integration, and the cross-border flows of trade, ser-
vices and capital (Held et al. 1999). 
6
 Defined as the upswing of the tertiary sector, the feminization of the workforce, and the mounting pressure on 
the welfare state in an era of “permanent austerity”, i.e. demographic aging combined with slow economic 
growth (Pierson 1996 and 2001). 
7
 Oesch (2006) distinguishes between four different work logics: self-employed, technical, organizational or 
interpersonal service. 
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solutions. Furthermore, since the winners are closer to the median voter, it seems safe to as-
sume that mainstream actors in general represent the winners. Of course, this also depends on 
the specific context of political conflict and thus may vary during specific periods such as 
electoral contests (see Schwander 2012). Yet, on the long run, these actors should favor fur-
ther deregulation and employ a mainly liberal framing strategy. Challengers, in contrast, 
might resort to protectionist and social democratic frames to justify policy measures that shel-
ter the losers (see Wueest 2012). In sum, the separation of a political left from a political right 
as well as mainstream actors from their challengers leads to distinct patterns in terms of the 
dichotomy between growth and compensation related framing strategies. 
 In general, we can assume that the political left emphasizes compensation more than the 
political right, since social democratic interests and values such as full employment and social 
justice clearly constitute its traditional core beliefs. In terms of our classification, we count 
‘old’ left actors (Social democrats, communist and radical socialist parties, and unions) as 
well as ‘new’ left actors (Greens and public interest groups) as part of the political left. How-
ever, if actors from the political left adapt to the structural changes in a way that attracts the 
winners, they might tend to be more balanced in terms of their framing. Most notably, this 
should apply for Social democratic and green parties which regularly are able to take over 
governmental responsibility. At least in some countries like Germany, these mainstream left 
actors are thus expected to emphasize more growth-related frames than the other left-wing 
actors, since they have to appeal to the economic winners in order to win elections. Moreover, 
due to their close alliance with the new left-wing parties, we would also expect public interest 
groups to pursue a similar framing strategy. Such a framing strategy might be termed a flex-
icurity approach, since (social democratic) compensation and (liberal) growth arguments 
should balance each other out. The left-oriented actors which are supposed as advocating for 
the losers, i.e., the trade unions and Communists/radical Socialists, are expected to highlight 
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compensation aspects. 
 On the political right, we expect a very similar trend. The mainstream representatives of 
economic winners which lean to the political right, including the peak employers’ associa-
tions, liberal and Christian democratic/conservative parties, as well as multinational corpora-
tions, should prefer the growth-related dimension of framing, since they are in favor of en-
hancing competitiveness and oppose protectionism and potentially costly welfare state 
measures. There are several actors which are not easily to define in terms of political right and 
left. This applies to public administrations, experts, EU and IGO actors as well as public en-
terprises. Yet, in line with their constant push to deepen and the European Single Market and 
to implement deregulative reforms on all levels, we expect these actors to tend towards 
growth-related strategy (Lehmkuhl 2006: 149, Howarth, 2006; Thatcher, 2007). 
 Finally, we expect a protectionist framing strategy, which is characterized by a right-
oriented ideological stance and a tendency to protect the domestic losers from the effects of 
more flexible employment relations. Small business associations and radical populist parties 
are anticipated to pursue this strategy. Eventually, we should find a similar framing as for the 
mainstream left, since these right challengers should also emphasize compensation, although 
for economic nationalist and not social democratic reasons. 
 In sum, the framing should be balanced between growth and compensation for the 
mainstream left actors and right challengers. For the mainstream right actors, it should clearly 
lean towards growth-related arguments, and left challengers are expected to disproportionally 
emphasize compensation frames. 
DESIGNING THE STUDY 
In order to create a comprehensive picture of the framing on employment relations, a 
comparative newspaper content analysis was conducted in Austria, France, Germany, the 
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Netherlands, Switzerland, and the U.K.
8
 The choice to rely on newspaper articles was guided 
by the rationale that other sources such as party manifestos, parliamentary debates or 
campaign material do not contain data on all politically relevant actors in the debate on 
employment relations. Actors such as corporations, experts or administrations have 
often been neglected in previous studies. The analyses rely on quality newspaper articles, 
detailing the frames applied in employment relations over the three years from 2004 to 2006. 
The newspapers include Le Monde (F), The Times (GB), the Süddeutsche Zeitung (D), the 
NRC Handelsblad (NL), Die Presse (A) and the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (CH). Given the fact 
that, due to the heavy workload of content analyses, only one media title could be considered, 
quality newspapers were chosen for conceptual reasons since they are particularly suit study 
of public debates. They remain the leading medium of political coverage, and both report the 
debates in the most detailed manner and inﬂuence the editorial decisions of a wide range of 
other news organizations (Vliegenthart and Walgrave, 2008; Reinemann, 2003). 
The single instances of framing were identiﬁed using the Core Sentence Approach 
(CSA). If a policy statement of a relevant actor is found in a text segment, this segment is 
reduced to its most basic structure (a core sentence) that contains only the subject (actor), the 
object (issue), the direction of the relationship between subject and object (polarity), and the 
justifications of the relationship (frames). The polarity is always quantiﬁed using a scale rang-
ing from -1 to +1, where -1 means opposition and 1 means support of economic liberalization, 
with three intermediary positions indicating a vague or ambiguous relationship. By frames, 
the problem deﬁnition an actor gives when taking a policy position is meant. Since actors reg-
ularly back their policy positions in public debates with multiple frames (Lerch and Schwell-
nus, 2006, p. 307), the coding of up to ﬁve frames per core sentence was allowed. The exam-
ple in Table 3 illustrates the coding procedure. This core sentence refers to Blair’s support of 
                                                 
8
 This content analysis data set was established by the authors and collaborators in the research project National 
Political Change in a Globalizing World (see Kriesi et al., 2012). 
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unspeciﬁc labor market reforms, which is complemented by a social protection frame (“in 
order to tackle record unemployment”) as well as a prosperity frame (“in order to tackle [...] 
sluggish growth”).  
[table 3 about here] 
To reduce time and costs, a two-step sampling strategy was performed. First, the rele-
vant events in each country were identiﬁed using various yearbooks as well as the annual re-
views of the newspapers in our sample. These lists formed the basis for an extensive keyword 
list for each country, helping us to electronically ﬁnd potentially relevant articles in the news-
paper databases. Second, a chronological sample of approximately the same number of arti-
cles per country was drawn. Chronological sampling tracks the frequency distribution of rele-
vant articles and therefore captures the peaks and troughs in the debate. Subsequently, due to 
the time-consuming nature of the coding procedure, at most the ﬁrst twenty core sentences of 
each article were coded. In sum, the data collection yielded a total of 2021 frames, which 
were aggregated to the six frame categories as illustrated by table A.1 in the appendix. 
In a pretest, six coders obtained a coefficient of reliability of 0.77 for coder agreement 
on the identification of core sentences. Inter-coder agreement for the correct annotation of 
actors and frames was 0.88 and 0.74, respectively. Given that the typical level of acceptance 
is 0.80 (Lombard et al., 2002), the agreement was already close to an acceptable threshold 
before the actual data collection started. Subsequently, additional coder training and improved 
coding instructions were provided in order to address the remaining uncertainties. Moreover, 
comparisons of this CSA data with data from expert judgments, party manifesto coding, and 
mass surveys, suggest that the external validity is given as well (see Helbling and Tresch, 
2011). 
THE STRUCTURE OF FRAMING ON EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS  
 To provide a broad overview of the content analysis data, table 3 shows the frame em-
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phasis and frame polarities with respect to the public debate on labor market issues. On the 
one hand, the table indicates the overall distribution of both the higher level and fine-grained 
frame categories in percentages (emphasis). This shows which frames are preferred to justify 
statements related to employment relations. On the other hand, the overall direction for the 
different frame categories is indicated (polarity). Frame polarities show whether a frame is 
predominantly used with supporting or opposing statements with regards to labor market re-
forms. A positive polarity always means support for more deregulation, i.e. policies that in-
duce a liberalization of employment relation or a privatization of labor market institutions. 
Note that the frame emphasis and polarity are always calculated using probability weights on 
the level of articles, which account for imbalances caused by the selection of articles. 
[table 4 about here] 
 As far as frame emphasis is concerned, liberal frames are clearly most often used as 
arguments to justify statements on labor market policies. With 46 percentage points they ac-
count for almost half of all frames. More precisely, prosperity-related frames are the most 
important category with a relative frequency of 36 percentage points. In contrast, social dem-
ocratic frames amount to only about one third of all frames used. Nevertheless, social security 
related arguments are used comparatively often with 27.3 percentage points. The use of these 
rather pragmatic frames clearly outstrips the more universalistic arguments related to econom-
ic fairness. Neomercantilist justifications are somewhat less important, making up for 19.8 
percent of all frames. Here, the frequency of arguments related to intervention and protection 
is roughly equal. 
 Turning to the polarity of the frames used in the debate on labor market issues, the total 
polarity indicates that the overall climate over all countries reflects support of deregulation 
(+0.11). While prosperity, protection, and, to a lesser degree, intervention are clearly used 
with statements in favor of more flexible labor markets (+0.35, +0.30, and +0.15, respective-
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ly), justifications pointing to economic freedom have a positive polarity so close to zero that a 
the direction should not be interpreted in terms of clear position in favor or against labor mar-
ket deregulation. A polarity of 0.04 means that positive and negative statements almost cancel 
each other out. The outcome of the debate is therefore merely ambivalent with respect to this 
frame category. Fairness and social security, by contrast, are heavily connected to the opposi-
tion of labor market deregulation (–0.23 and –0.18). Both social democratic frame categories 
thus countervail the distinctly positive polarities related to prosperity and protection frames. 
HOW FRAME POLARITIES ALIGN 
 After establishing an overview of the distribution of frames, the analysis proceeds with 
the question of how the actors’ frame polarities are structured into underlying dimensions of 
the frame competition on employment relations. To this aim, a factor analysis was applied to 
the frame polarities, which is shown in table 5.
9
 In this data, the eigenvalue test, as well as the 
parallel analysis shown in figure A.1 in the appendix both indicate a two-factor solution as an 
optimal representation of the structure of the frame polarities. 
[table 5 about here] 
 The polarities of the two liberal frames load higher on the first factor (highlighted in 
bold), which therefore can be regarded as a conflict dimension that separates actors emphasiz-
ing economic growth as priority from those that promote fairer employment relations. Yet not 
only free market framing strategies (prosperity with 0.31 and economic freedom with 0.54), 
but also the framing related to state-led development strategies align on this dimension, since 
intervention has a higher factor loading here as well (0.76). This result was expected on the 
basis of the prevailing economic orthodoxy in Western Europe. Overall, deregulation is thus 
primarily justified as a growth strategy in the sense of economic promotion by the public au-
                                                 
9
 The factors could not be calculated over all 14 actor categories and six countries, since not all combinations are 
present in the data and actors with less than five statements were not considered. The final number of observa-
tions is therefore 61. 
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thorities. State intervention is thus only consistent with this framing strategy if the emphasis 
lies on enhancing business opportunities. 
 The second factor is built around the combination of social democratic frames and pro-
tectionist justifications. Fairness has a factor loading of 0.56, social security loads with 0.68, 
and slightly less clear, protection has a value of 0.24 on this dimension. Since the common 
denominator of these three categories is protection, in a social or territorial sense, the dimen-
sion corresponds to the expected compensation-related aspects of the framing of employment 
relations. This dimension therefore reflects the longstanding demand for the cushioning of 
increasing market risks with an extension of the welfare state and the selective protectionism 
of non-competitive economic sectors. As suggested in the theoretical section of this paper, 
this result also means that the framing approaches of the mainstream left and protectionist 
right challengers might not really be distinguishable from each other, since the compensation 
related arguments aiming at the protection of domestic markets coincide with the social as-
pects of compensation. 
 The following analyses build on the results from this factor analysis. More precisely, the 
factor scores or the actors’ and countries’ emphasis of the two dimensions will be used to ex-
plore the framing strategies in more detail. 
FRAME EMPHASIS BY ACTORS AND COUNTRIES 
 Besides the study of how the different frame categories align in terms of the justification 
of support and opposition to labor market deregulation, it is also crucial to explore frame em-
phasis. This second aspect of framing strategies involves the manipulation of the salience of 
specific frames in order to shape the meaning of employment relations policies. Table 6 
shows an OLS regression on the actors’ and countries’ frame emphasis of the compensation 
dimension. For both the countries and actors, the category with the highest use of growth re-
lated frames was chosen as a reference. These are the public enterprises and the U.K. Signifi-
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cant deviances from the reference category–in combination with positive coefficients–show 
whether the actors or countries are moderately or heavily using more compensation-related 
arguments. Since the dependent variable has a range from 0 to 1, if multiplied by 100 the co-
efficients can be conveniently interpreted as percentages of explained variance of the usage of 
compensation. Furthermore, since we have identified two dimensions and are seeking to ex-
plain the share of the compensation dimension, the results, if reversed, can be taken as evi-
dence for the usage of growth arguments. 
[table 6 about here] 
 All left-oriented actors in the sample clearly insist on compensation. The Communists 
and radical Socialists, private and public sector unions, public interest groups and social dem-
ocratic parties all use significantly more compensation frames than public enterprises. Fur-
thermore, confirming the hypotheses, we see that there are left-oriented actors which only 
moderately deviate from right-oriented actors, somewhat neglecting compensation related 
arguments. These are the Social democrats with a 25.5 percentage point higher propensity for 
compensation, and the public interest groups with 39.4 percentage point higher usage of justi-
fication related to compensation. Both categories of unions and the left fringe parties (Com-
munists/Radical Socialists) all have highly significant and substantive (46.3 percentage points 
or higher) preferences of compensation compared to public enterprises. Yet, not only tradi-
tionally left-wing actors, but also one actor usually affiliated with the political right were 
found to significantly emphasize compensation. The small business associations have a 35 
percentage point higher likelihood of using compensation related justifications. This corrobo-
rates the expectations that also right-wing challengers rely on compensation for their public 
communication. However, contrary to expectations, the radical populist right does not show a 
similar framing strategy. We will see below that this could be due to country-specific charac-
teristics, since the radical populist right parties are able to enter the debate only in Austria and 
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Switzerland. 
 As for the remaining actors on the political right, they do not significantly deviate from 
public enterprises in terms of their frame emphasis. This means that a broad range of im-
portant actors, from center right parties to business actors and public administrations, prefer to 
justify their positions on labor market issues in terms of economic growth. Since this applies 
to 9 of the 14 actor categories, we therefore can observe a pro-market dominance in the public 
debate on employment relations. 
 With regard to the countries categorization, we observe that framing corresponds with 
coordination patterns, with Germany as the only exception. Switzerland is not significantly 
different from the U.K. here, the most pro-growth leaning country. This means that the Swiss 
debate is also little shaped by a focus on compensation. In the Netherlands, there is a little 
more emphasis of justifications related to social and national protection, as the slightly signif-
icant but rather low coefficient shows. Compared to the U.K., the Dutch actors use compensa-
tion frames 16.6 percentage points more often. Austria and especially France, as expected, 
show a substantially higher compensation-related framing. The more coordinated structure of 
the employment relation regime in the case of Austria, as well as the stronger position of the 
state in the case of France, therefore correspond to a higher propensity to refer to compensa-
tion. But, as also suggested by our assumption, the framing pattern in these countries also 
seems to depend on the degree of pressure for reform. Austria and France are the two coun-
tries with the lowest implementation rate of liberalization reforms, which might have caused 
the debate to have shifted towards more growth-related arguments. As a result of their com-
petitive disadvantage, the Austrian and French usage of growth thus is stronger that in the 
German debate, where the successfully implemented large-scale employment reforms may 
has dampen the enthusiasm for pro-market arguments. 
 As clear-cut as the results of table 6 may seem, it is still not evident whether the framing 
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patterns are consistent across countries or whether we find different relationships between 
country contexts and the framing of different actors. Figure 2 provides the fitted values of the 
actors’ emphasis of compensation related arguments to show the country-specific framing 
patterns for each actor. More precisely, the bars show the actors’ degree of emphasis of com-
pensation frames in decreasing order, i.e. the actor with the strongest emphasis of compensa-
tion is placed on top. Furthermore, the order of the countries within each actor category corre-
sponds to the overall country effects of the regression shown in table 5. The indicator runs 
from 0 meaning no emphasis of compensation to 1 meaning an exclusive usage of compensa-
tion-related frames. 
[figure 2 about here] 
 A first striking result is that the country patterns are completely consistent even at the 
country-specific actor level, for example the German actors of every category use compensa-
tion arguments more than their counterparts in France. This is a clear finding in favor of the 
divergence model and, according to our theoretical argumentation, points to the fact that the 
coordination patterns and reform pressures in the systems of employment relations are con-
nected to the framing. However, we also find a strong relationship with regard to the actor 
characteristics independent from country differences. In every country four actors justify their 
position on labor market policies more frequently with compensation arguments than with 
growth-related frames (Communists/Radical socialist parties, private and public sector unions 
as well as small business associations). While this finding exactly meets the expectations for 
the three left-oriented actors, , the result for the small business associations is even more in-
teresting in light of our assumption that compensation relates to welfare as well as the nation-
al control of employment relations. This right challenger was expected to pursue a balanced 
framing strategy, but especially the German small business associations heavily frame their 
position on labor market deregulation in terms of compensation. Yet the other two groups of 
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small business associations for which we have data, the Austrian and Swiss ones, show a rela-
tively balanced framing with an emphasis of compensation close to 0.5. As for the left-wing 
challengers, only the British unions pursue a distinctively balanced framing strategy. This 
might be attributed to the overall weak position of labor interests in the U.K. ever since the 
confrontation with the Thatcher government in the 1980s, as well as the strong prevalence of 
growth frames in the U.K., which presumably forces unions to adapt to the overall political 
climate. 
 As expected, the two mainstream left actors in the sample, the Social democratic parties 
and public interest groups, employ generally balanced framing.
10
 As for the Social democrats, 
the country effects and not individual characteristics such as governmental responsibility 
seem to be the distinguishing factor. While the governing Labour party in the UK shows very 
weak usage of compensation frames, the German SPD puts a lot of emphasis on compensa-
tion although it was also in government during the whole research time frame (from Septem-
ber 2005 on in the grand coalition with the Union under Chancellor Merkel). We see a similar 
pattern for two actors usually attributed to the mainstream right. The Christian democrats and 
Conservatives, as well as experts in Germany and France show a balanced framing. Their 
counterparts in the other four countries use growth arguments more frequently, especially so 
in the U.K. Nevertheless, in all countries, these two actors use less compensation frames than 
the public interest groups and Social democrats. Once again, this seems to correspond rather 
to the overall patterns than to specific actor characteristics. With respect to the Christian dem-
ocrats and Conservatives we have, for example, parties in government with an emphasis on 
compensation (in France) as well as ones with an emphasis of growth (in the Netherlands). 
 The remaining seven actors, with the exception of the radical populist right parties, can 
                                                 
10
 The Greens had less than 5 statements in every country and were therefore excluded from the analyses. This 
might come as a surprise with respect to countries like Austria or Germany, where the green parties regularly 
have a strong standing in politics in general. However, it seems to confirm that the environment and cultural 
liberalism but not economic policies are the core issues of this actor (see Kriesi et al. 2012). 
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all be classified as mainstream right-oriented actors and, as expected, show a framing leaning 
toward an emphasis on growth. Especially multinational corporations, public enterprises, and 
EU/IGO actors heavily rely on growth arguments to justify their positions on labor market 
deregulation. Altogether, the at least partly strong emphasis of growth-related frames by half 
of the actors in the debate leads to a prevalence of this liberal-interventionist dimension in the 
public debate on employment relations. The radical populist right also ignores compensation 
arguments to a large extent, which seems surprising in the light of the high share of blue-
collar workers and the petty bourgeoisie in its constituency. Moreover, this stands in contrast 
to expectations but might actually correspond to the ‘winning formula’ as found by Kitschelt 
(1999) for the right-wing populists in Austria and Switzerland, i.e. the notion that the populist 
right mobilizes the loser on cultural issues and pursues a winners’ program on economic is-
sues (see Kriesi et al. 2008). Furthermore, in contrast to all other European right-wing popu-
lists, both the Swiss and Austrian ones had governmental responsibility on the national level 
during the time frame of the analyses. This might constitute and additional factor drawing 
them into a more growth emphasizing framing strategy. 
 In sum, figure 2 therefore reveals the combined relationship of country and actor char-
acteristics regarding the framing of employment relations. There is a quite consistent left-right 
pattern in terms of an emphasis on compensation, whereas the mainstream left clearly devi-
ates from the other left-oriented actors in its balanced framing. Furthermore, one challenger 
from the right, the small business associations, is also among the actors emphasizing compen-
sation more often than growth-related arguments. As for the remaining right actors, they seem 
to use a reasonably strict pro-market strategy. 
CONCLUSION 
The main aim of this contribution was to explore the frame usage of the different ac-
tors engaging in the politics of employment relations in six west-European countries. Thus, 
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we started from the assumption that the study of framing can reveal a great deal about the 
dynamics of political struggles on employment relations. First of all, our analysis of frame 
polarities resulted in two framing strategies, the first being a combination of the social-
democratic frames (“social protection” and “fairness”) with the neo-mercantilist category re-
lated to “protection”. The second general frame dimension was composed of the liberal 
“prosperity” and “economic freedom” frames with the neoliberal “intervention”. This broad 
picture of two competing framing patterns corresponds to the distinction between a political 
mainstream focus on economic growth and an alternative dimension emphasizing compensa-
tion. 
Moreover, given the different ideological traditions characterizing the European coun-
tries and according to the analytical framework of the comparative political economy litera-
ture, it is likely that the national pathways diverge with respect to the overall framing of de-
regulating labor market reforms. In fact, we could confirm the often-raised claim that values 
and norms have a different substantial meaning among countries (e.g. Medrano 2003). We 
could show that the countries in our sample correspond to the typology developed on the basis 
of the VoC literature and the discrepancies can be explained by means of an interacting varia-
ble conceptualized as the overall pressure for reform in labor markets. As it becomes evident 
from the major labor market reforms currently occurring throughout Europe, such as the Hartz 
IV reform in Germany or the Universal Credit reform in the U.K., this policy domain is un-
dergoing significant changes as a consequence of the transformation of the socio-economic 
context induced by globalization and post-industrialization. Accordingly, we found that the 
contemporary pressure for a reform in a country crucially affects the framing in the debate on 
employment relations. 
More precisely, the results indicate that in Germany, France, Austria, and to a lesser 
extent in the Netherlands, compensation frames prevail, whereas in the traditionally more 
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liberal economies of the U.K. and Switzerland growth frames are emphasized more heavily. 
The most interesting result is the comparatively less intense use of compensation frames in 
France and Austria than in Germany. In the historically state-led economy of France and the 
traditionally social democracy-dominated Austrian corporatism, the pent-up deregulation re-
forms seem to have led to an insistence on growth-related arguments, whereas in the success-
fully reformed German system of labor relations, compensation frames to cushion the conse-
quences are prominent. Finally, the debate in the small export-oriented economies of Switzer-
land and the Netherlands, as expected, is somewhat more pro-market oriented than the other 
continental countries. As our analyses show, these results are consistent across all actors rele-
vant for the public debate on employment relations. 
The empirical results additionally show that frame usage differs considerably between 
political actors as well. The actors’ framing seems to depend on their traditional ideological 
orientation and on their adaptation to the structural changes, i.e. whether they represent the 
winners or losers of globalization and post-industrialization. Left-wing challengers such as 
Communists and Radical socialists and trade unions emphasize foremost compensation 
frames, which should draw support from the losers of recent politico-economic developments. 
In contrast, the left-wing mainstream actors invoke frames related to welfare or national pro-
tection only moderately more frequently than the political right. This leads to a similar fram-
ing pattern as right-wing actors, such as small business associations, which seek to accommo-
date to the losers of recent structural transformations. However, it remains an open question 
as to whether the left-wing mainstream actors and right-wing challengers show a similar 
framing of employment relations for different reasons, i.e. whether the former seek compen-
sation for social security reasons and the latter intend to protect domestic markets. Finally, 
right mainstream actors such as public enterprises or the public administration, use first and 
foremost growth frames, accommodating the globalization winners. Altogether, the analyses 
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thus lead to the conclusion that the prevalent economic orthodoxy in Western Europe is re-
flected by an overall dominance of justification related to prosperity, economic promotion, 
and economic freedom. How this dominance plays out in the debates of the single countries, 
however, seems to be a matter of distinct national differences.  
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(ONLINE) APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1: Allocation of Justifications to the Frame Categories 
Prosperity 
Innovation; economic prosperity in general (of individuals, companies or sectors); wealth in general; 
free trade; globalization; investments; profits; corporate management; competitiveness; research and 
development; economic progress. 
Economic freedom 
Economic self-interest; entrepreneurial success; blessing of capitalism and free markets; freedom of 
economic activity in general; neo-liberal ideology; individual responsibility; entrepreneurial freedom; 
freedom of choice. 
Intervention 
Market failure; fiscal policy; bureaucracy; political efficiency; public goods (education, infrastructure 
etc.); economic promotion in general; delinquency (corruption, clandestine employment, black mar-
ket etc.); security in general; political stability; inflation policy. 
Protection 
Protectionism in general; relocation abroad and foreign take-overs; loss of traditions; answer to glob-
alization; benefit for domestic or local business; national identity; national autonomy; national sover-
eignty; national interest in general; immigration. 
Social protection 
Employment protection; labor disputes and strikes; reducing unemployment; job quality; occupation-
al health; social dumping; stakeholder interests; social security in general; consumer protection; indi-
vidual well-being in general; labor relations and union agreements. 
Fairness 
Human dignity; democratic and participatory principles; equality of opportunity; poverty relief (as a 
moral duty); cultural diversity; gender equality; minority rights; exploitation; peace; solidarity with 
developing countries; public welfare; noncommercial values; humanitarian law; social justice in gen-
eral; socialist ideology. 
 
Table A.2: Actor Classiﬁcation as Used in the Analyses 
Basic categories Refinements 
Public authorities 
IGO and EU actors 
Public administrations 
Interest groups 
Public sector unions 
Private sector unions 
Peak employer associations and white collar organizations 
Small business associations and farmer organizations 
Party Families 
Communists/Radical socialist parties 
Greens 
Social democratic parties 
Liberals 
Christian democrats/Conservative parties 
Radical populist right parties 
External actors 
Multinational corporations 
Public enterprises 
Experts 
Public interest groups 
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Figure A.1: Scree Test for the Number of Factors on Frame Polarities 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1: Conceptualization of Framing Categories 
Ideology Frame label Description 
Liberal 
Prosperity Emphasis of innovation, economic performance and growth  
Economic freedom Insisting on individual and entrepreneurial freedom 
Neomercantilist  
 
Intervention Need for the regulation of markets and economic promotion 
Protection  Fostering traditional production and national wealth 
Social Democratic 
Social Security Demanding redistribution and employment protection 
Fairness  Respect of social rights and egalitarian values 
 
Figure 1: Mechanisms leading to the framing of employment relations 
 
 
Table 2: Coordination patterns and reform pressure by country 
 
EPL level 
Coordination 
Index 
Number of liberalizing 
EPL reforms 
Austria 2.04 1.00  5 
France 2.80 0.69  7 
Germany 2.52 0.95 17 
Netherlands 2.34 0.66 12 
Switzerland 1.06 0.51 n.a. 
UK 0.59 0.07 15 
Notes: EPL=Employment protection legislation. Sources: 1
st
 column: OECD 2012, Mean of Employment Pro-
tection Legislation 1990-2008; 2
nd
 column: Hall-Gingrich Coordination Index 1990-1995; 3
rd
 column: Fonda-
zione Rodolfo De Benedetti 2012, Total number of liberalizing EPL reforms (discrete and incremental) from 
1980 to 2004. 
 
Table 3: CSA Coding example 
“Mr. Blair has made economic reform the top priority of his presidency, hoping to make labor markets 
more ﬂexible in order to tackle record unemployment and sluggish growth across the continent.” 
(The Times, May 31 2005, Battle for the heart of Europe) 
Subject Polarity Issue Frames 
Blair +1 Labor market reform Social protection/Prosperity 
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Table 4: Frame Emphasis and Frame Polarity 
  
Emphasis 
in % 
Polarity 
Liberal 46.0 0.28 
   Prosperity 36.0 0.35 
   Economic freedom 10.0 0.04 
Neomercantilist 19.8 0.21 
   Intervention 11.7 0.15 
   Protection 8.1 0.30 
Social democratic 34.2 -0.19 
   Fairness 6.9 -0.23 
   Social security 27.3 -0.18 
Total % / polarity 100 0.11 
N 2021 
Notes: Article and country weights applied. Framing=Share in 
percentages; Polarity=Average positions. 
 
Table 5: Results of Factor Analysis on Frame Polarities 
 
Growth 
(Factor1) 
Securing 
(Factor2) 
Unique- 
ness 
Prosperity 0.31 0.20 0.86 
Economic freedom 0.54 0.19 0.68 
Intervention 0.76 0.00 0.42 
Protection 0.08 0.24 0.94 
Fairness 0.02 0.56 0.69 
Social security 0.24 0.68 0.48 
Eigenvalue 1.93 1.17  
Explained variance 17% 15%  
Notes: Article and country weights applied for all calcula-
tions. N=61. 
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Table 6: Results of OLS Regression on Emphasis of Compensation 
 
Estimates Std. Err. Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept 0.055 0.105 n.s. 
Actors (ref=Public enterprises) 
Public administrations 0.080 0.126 n.s. 
Christian democratic/Conservative parties 0.155 0.119 n.s. 
Communists/Radical socialist parties 0.589 0.168 ** 
IGO and EU actors 0.186 0.222 n.s. 
Experts 0.195 0.119 n.s. 
Liberals 0.214 0.168 n.s. 
Multinational corporations 0.046 0.119 n.s. 
Peak employer associations 0.101 0.119 n.s. 
Private sector unions 0.528 0.134 *** 
Public interest groups 0.394 0.168 * 
Public sector unions 0.463 0.119 *** 
Radical populist right parties 0.059 0.168 n.s. 
Small business associations 0.350 0.147 * 
Social democratic parties 0.255 0.125 * 
Countries (ref=UK) 
Austria 0.212 0.090 * 
Switzerland 0.142 0.085 n.s. 
Germany 0.341 0.093 *** 
France 0.308 0.099 ** 
Netherlands 0.166 0.092 + 
N 61 
  R
2
 0.62 
Adjusted R
2
 0.44 
  F-statistic 3.48*** on 19 and 41 DF 
Notes: Significance codes: ***≤0.001, **≤0.01, * ≤0.05, +≤0.1. DF=degrees 
of freedom. Actors with less than 5 statements excluded from the calculation. 
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Figure 2: Frame emphasis of compensation by actor 
 
Notes: Actors with less than 5 statements excluded from the calculation. Fitted values=Results from regression 
shown in table 5; max.=1. Labels: Admin.=Public administrations, Chris.Con.=Christian democrat-
ic/Conservative parties, Com.Soc=Communists/Radical socialist parties, EU/IGO=IGO and EU actors, 
Mult.corp.=Multinational corporations, Peak.empl.=Peak employer associations, Publ.ent=Public enterprises, 
Publ.union=Public sector unions, Pri.union=Private sector unions, Rad.pop=Radical populist right parties, 
Small.bus.=Small business associations, Soc.dem.=Social democratic parties; A=Austria, CH=Switzerland, 
FR=France, DE=Germany, NL=Netherlands. 
